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Key functions of public health agencies are the development of programs and 
procedures at both the national and state level, guided by science, to prevent and control 
Transboundary animal diseases (TADs).   Recent efforts in the United States have focused on 
developing emergency vaccination plans for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks and 
programs for training of swine workers to collect surveillance samples in the event of 
commercial swine TAD outbreaks.  I worked with the Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA) 
Division of Animal Health (DAH) to develop plans and procedures for two different, yet related 
projects.  I developed a detailed standard operating procedure for the implementation of the 
Certified Swine Collector Program.  This program trains swine workers to support surveillance 
efforts in the event of a TAD outbreak in commercial facilities, relieving veterinarians to focus on 
the outbreak investigation.  I also restructured KDA’s Foot and Mouth Disease emergency 
vaccination plan and performed a gap analysis to assist them in preparation for an upcoming 
national tabletop vaccination exercise. My primary objective was to provide the framework for 
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Chapter 1 - Literature Review 
.  Key functions of state and US animal health agencies are the development of 
programs and procedures at both the national and state level, guided by science, to prevent and 
control Transboundary animal diseases.  TADs that target agricultural animals, such as cattle or 
swine, can result in production and economic losses (World Organization for Animal Health, 
2012). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations defined TADs as 
“epidemic diseases which are highly contagious…and have the potential for rapid spread, 
irrespective of national borders, causing socio-economic and possibly public health 
consequences” (Emergency Prevention System: TADs, 2021).  Agricultural animals are sources 
of nutritional food for families and income for producers so TADs that cause severe disease or 
mortality threaten food security (Torres-Velez, Havas, Spiegel, & Brown, 2019) Recent TAD 
preparation efforts in the United States have focused on developing emergency vaccination 
plans for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks and programs for training of swine workers 
to collect surveillance samples in the event of commercial swine TAD outbreaks.   
State agricultural departments are tasked with ensuring a safe food supply for both 
animal and plant products, while ensuring safe and responsible practices.  The Kansas 
Department of Agriculture (KDA) has been functioning in one form or another since 1857 
(Kansas Historical Society, 2013).  While originally organized to deal with animal claims and 
road maintenance, KDA’s responsibilities now include functioning as a regulatory agency to 
ensure “responsible and judicious use of pesticides and nutrients”, protect Kansas’s natural and 
cultivated plants, ensure responsible use of state waters, and ensure a safe food supply 
(Kansas Department of Agriculture, 2016).  Out of 12 divisions and programs, the Division of 
Animal Health (DAH) is tasked with animal disease control, animal facilities inspection, and 
managing brands (Division of Animal Health, 2016).  Veterinarians within KDA-DAH are 
responsible for the programs that prevent and respond to animal disease outbreaks, conduct 
epidemiologic investigations, and conduct surveillance programs (Kansas Department of 
Agriculture, 2016). My preceptor for this Field Experience was Dr. Sara McReynolds, the 
Assistant Animal Health Commissioner for KDA. Her background experience includes working 
as a mixed animal practitioner, completion of a PhD in epidemiology, and working as an 





 1.1 Certified Swine Sample Collector Program 
The swine industry contributes significantly to the U.S. economy and introduction of a 
TAD could be catastrophic.  In 2009, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
estimated that $14.4 billion dollars of farm income was from the sale of swine (USDA-APHIS; 
CFSPH, 2011). Most commercial swine are raised in a concentrated animal feeding operation 
(CAFOs) (National Association of Local Boards of Health, 2010).   Swine CAFOs are intensive 
“just-in-time” operations, meaning that there is a constant flow of animals through the various 
stages of production to slaughter (USDA-APHIS; CFSPH, 2011). The stages of production are 
often separated by miles between different facilities.  According to the USDA, this model 
improves biosecurity and efficiency of operations, as each site is dedicated to a single stage of 
production (USDA-APHIS; CFSPH, 2011).  The USDA reports that 71% of pigs enter their final 
stage (finisher stage) at a separate location from where they were born. This results in 
extensive intra- and interstate movement for thousands of animals every day.  A stop-movement 
of just a few days secondary to a swine TAD outbreak, could cause massive overcrowding and 
other animal welfare issues (USDA-APHIS; CFSPH, 2011). Current TADs of concern to the 
swine industry include Classical Swine Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF), or Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD)   
CSF is a highly infectious disease of swine caused by a pestivirus (Spickler, Classical 
Swine Fever, 2015). Clinical disease includes fever, weakness, anorexia, hemorrhages of the 
skin, and cyanotic discoloration of the snout, ears, and tail (Spickler, Classical Swine Fever, 
2015). CSF was eradicated from the U.S. in 1978, but threat of reintroduction persists as the 
disease is endemic in Asia, South America, and Central America (USDA-APHIS, 2020). 
Economic losses arise from abortions, poor health, and mortality rates that vary with the strain 
of the virus.  The virus is easily spread through oral or nasal routes but can also enter through 
the mucosa and abrasions (USDA-APHIS, 2020). There is no treatment and pigs who have 
recovered clinically may continue to spread the virus (Spickler, Classical Swine Fever, 2015).  
ASF is an arboviral infectious disease of pigs of increasing concern.  Originally 
circulating in sub-Saharan Africa, it has now spread through the domestic swine and wild boar 
populations in Asia and Europe (USDA-APHIS, 2019).  It is a hemorrhagic disease with clinical 
signs similar to CSF, including reddened skin, cyanosis of extremities, fever, and bloody 
diarrhea (Torres-Velez, Havas, Spiegel, & Brown, 2019).  ASF is primarily spread by direct 
contact, however soft-body ticks in the genus Ornithodoros have played a role in transmission in 





uncooked pork products (Spickler, African Swine Fever, 2019).  Outbreaks of ASF in countries 
with naïve swine populations, such as the U.S., are at risk of severe economic impacts due to 
the high mortality rate and the economic costs of eradicating the disease (USDA-APHIS, 2019).    
FMD is a viral disease impacting cloven hoofed animals. It is a highly contagious 
disease but rarely fatal (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015).  The virus, of the genus 
Aphthovirus in the family Picornoviridae, is transmitted in all secretions and excretions of 
infected animals, including but not limited to saliva, milk, feces, and urine (Mahy, 2005). 
Infection of a susceptible animal results in fever and painful vesicles erupting in and around the 
mouth, on the feet, and on the mammary glands (Mahy, 2005). Swine are considered amplifying 
hosts as they shed large quantities of viral particles, making them significant contributors to the 
spread of disease (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015).  FMD affects species beyond 
swine and will be discussed further later in this chapter as it pertains to outbreak response 
planning.  
Commercial swine operations in the U.S. could see catastrophic results if any of the 
aforementioned TADs are introduced into the population.  Despite the high biosecurity 
measures of most commercial producers, the structure of the industry as a connected series of 
CAFO’s and the highly infectious nature of these viruses means a large number of animals 
could be impacted before the disease is detected.  In the event a TAD is detected, State Animal 
Health Officials (SAHOs) would likely institute a stop-movement order to prevent continued 
spread of the disease as animals are transported between the different stages of production 
(KDA-Division of Animal Health, 2018).  While necessary, these stop-movement orders if 
continued too long, could result in overcrowding and necessitate euthanasia of affected animals 
(USDA-APHIS; CFSPH, 2011).  It would be imperative, therefore, to lift the stop-movement for 
as many facilities as possible, as rapidly and efficiently as possible, while maintaining necessary 
biosecurity to prevent disease spread.  A strong surveillance system, with repeated sampling 
and laboratory testing, to determine if a facility is free of disease is required.    
  In the event of an outbreak, state and local resources are likely to become exhausted 
and veterinary support will be in high demand.  Currently in the United States, swine-focused 
veterinarians either collect or oversee the collection of swine samples to test for domestic 
diseases on production sites. Kansas contributes 2.7% of the nation’s total swine population, 
ranking number 10 (Shahbandeh, 2020).  There are approximately 1,000 swine farms in 
Kansas, with 150 of these facilities representing 99% of the state’s pig inventory (Kansas Pork 





veterinarians authorized in the state to issue health certificates for interstate and international 
movement of livestock and poultry.  However, the actual number available to support a 
commercial swine outbreak is potentially much lower, dependent on whether they are 
comfortable and competent working with swine and their willingness to assist in an outbreak.  
During a TAD outbreak, not only do sample collection requirements increase, but biosecurity 
regulations and downtime requirements also increase.  Pre-positioned, well-trained personnel 
could provide the necessary support to perform the surveillance sampling needed to return 
unaffected facilities to normal operations more promptly.   
The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) set a precedent that makes it feasible for 
the swine industry to use existing caretakers and producers of swine in the outbreak response.  
Established in 1935, the NPIP is a voluntary testing and certification program between the 
states and the USDA that has worked to improve flock performance, breeding, and eliminate a 
variety of diseases (USDA APHIS, 2020).  The objective of the program is to set the standards 
for flocks and breeding stock to be certified as “free” from the specified diseases (USDA APHIS, 
2020).  The code of federal regulations that covers the NPIP permits the state to employ 
“qualified persons as State Inspectors to perform the qualification testing of participating flocks.” 
To meet the demand for sampling and testing of thousands of birds, the NPIP established the 
Authorized Testing Agent, a trained and designated person who is permitted to test flocks, 
specifically for Salmonella Pullorum-Typhoid (9 CFR, 2018). The testing agents are trained and 
tested prior to authorizing them to perform routine testing. 
The precedent set by the NPIP facilitated a multi-state agreement led by the National 
Pork Board (NPB) to utilize similar support in the event of a commercial swine TAD outbreak.  
Certified Swine Sample Collectors would be individuals trained by USDA Category II accredited 
veterinarians according to a standardized program to collect diagnostic samples and submit to a 
specified laboratory in the event of a CSF, ASF, or FMD outbreak in the U.S.  The curriculum 
and training materials are under development by the NPB; however, it is incumbent on 
individual states to establish the procedures for initiating and maintaining certification of 
collectors.  By using individuals employed at each swine facility, this program overcomes the 
hurdle presented by increased biosecurity and frees veterinarians to focus efforts on infected or 
contact premises.  If the certified sampler program is successfully implemented and maintained 
before a TAD outbreak, the swine industry would be better prepared to meet the rapid increase 
in sampling requirements and reinstate movement of unaffected premises as quickly as 






 1.2 FMD Emergency Vaccination Plan 
Diseases impacting more than one species and production system require extensive 
planning and coordination to control and eradicate the disease.  Development of an FMD 
emergency vaccination plan is an example. FMD is a globally significant infectious disease of 
cloven-hoofed animals with historic outbreaks occurring in every livestock region of the world, 
except New Zealand (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015).  Once found worldwide, it has 
been eradicated from specific parts of the world, including the U.S. (Grubman & Baxt, 2004). 
The first report of outbreaks in the U.S. occurred in 1870.  There were nine outbreaks in the 
U.S. before strict stamping-out and quarantine procedures successfully eradicated the disease 
in 1929 (Segarra & Rawson, 2001).  
The significance of FMD to animal health and agriculture lies in its highly infectious 
nature and the production losses secondary to infection that threaten food security.  Though 
most mature animals recover from the initial illness in 2-3 weeks, production losses persist long 
after recovery.  Producers may see up to a 33% reduction in milk output, and abortions 
secondary to infection reduce calf crops and milk yield (World Organization for Animal Health, 
2012).  Infection can also result in chronically reduced growth rates and failure to thrive (World 
Organization for Animal Health, 2012).    Failure to eradicate the disease results in exclusion 
from international markets  (Field Experiences with Emergency FMD Vaccination, 2015).  FMD 
control is considered global public good because it benefits all countries.  As a result, the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) developed control policy recommendations to obtain an 
FMD-free status and open international trade (World Organization for Animal Health, 2012).  
The OIE also developed recommendations for countries to regain their FMD-free status 
following an outbreak.  These recommendations have evolved as recent outbreaks have 
identified alternative control measures to the traditional stamping-out (Grubman & Baxt, 2004) 
FMD is a viral disease caused by the FMD virus, from the genus Pithovirus and in the 
family Picornoviridae (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015). The virus exists in 7 major 
serotypes (O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 1) and has more than 60 strains (Mahy, 
2005).  Exposure to one serotype does not confer immunity to other serotypes, making 
prophylactic vaccination to prevent disease problematic. Susceptible animals include cattle, 





Disease morbidity is extremely high among a susceptible population, occasionally 
approaching 100% (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015). The virus is transmitted in all 
secretions and excretions of infected animals, including but not limited to saliva, milk, feces, and 
urine (Mahy, 2005). It enters the host animal through inhalation, ingestion, mucous membranes, 
or abrasions of the skin. Infection of a susceptible animal results in fever and painful vesicles 
erupting in and around the mouth, on the feet, and on the mammary glands (Mahy, 2005). The 
disease is rarely fatal, except to young animals who develop myocarditis (Spickler, Foot and 
Mouth Disease, 2015). However, recovered mature animals may exhibit decreases in milk 
production, chronic lameness, mastitis, and loss of condition (World Organization for Animal 
Health, 2012). Cattle appear to be maintenance hosts, requiring less viral particles to become 
infected (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015).  Swine, however, are considered amplifying 
hosts as they shed large quantities of viral particles, making them significant contributors to the 
spread of disease (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015).  Sheep and goats rarely exhibit 
clinical signs and it is unclear whether they can maintain FMD for a long period (Spickler, Foot 
and Mouth Disease, 2015).   
Control and eradication efforts during an outbreak may be complicated by the 
survivability of FMD virus in the environment and the duration of the latent period of infection in 
comparison to the incubation period.  FMD virus can survive in the environment for an average 
of 3 months under favorable conditions and can easily be spread between farms and species 
via fomites such as clothing or equipment (Spickler, Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015). The 
incubation period, defined as the time from infection to appearance of clinical signs ranges from 
2-14 days, based on the dose and route of transmission (Mahy, 2005).  However, the latent 
period, defined as the time from infection to shedding viral particles may be shorter (Spickler, 
Foot and Mouth Disease, 2015).  As a result, preclinical shedding may spread the virus for 
almost 2-4 days before the disease is identified and control measures implemented.  Diagnosis 
of FMD requires sampling of the vesicles and skin and identification of the virus and specific 
serotype through Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assays (ELISAs) and Reverse-Transcriptase 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) (World Organization for Animal Health, 2012).  No 
treatment exists and prevention efforts generally focus on policy and trade measures to prevent 
infected animals or animal products from entering disease-free countries (Spickler, Foot and 
Mouth Disease, 2015).   
Arguably some of the most notable FMD outbreaks used to guide global policy and 





Uruguay.  The United Kingdom outbreak began in February 2001, though it went for at least 3 
weeks before identification (Grubman & Baxt, 2004).  This delay resulted in spread of FMD 
serotype O to 16 out of 23 counties in England.  With stamping out as the primary control 
strategy in order to return quickly to FMD-free status, the United Kingdom ultimately slaughtered 
6 million animals (Grubman & Baxt, 2004).  The outbreak took approximately 7 months to 
control, with the last case documented at the end of September 2001 (Field Experiences with 
Emergency FMD Vaccination, 2015).  The economic cost of the outbreak varied between 12.3-
13.8 billion U.S. dollars, due to direct production losses and lost tourism secondary to the stop-
movement (Grubman & Baxt, 2004). In stark contrast, Uruguay quickly moved to vaccination as 
a method to stop the outbreak secondary to FMD serotype A (Sutmoller & Olascoaga, 2002).  
The initial stamping out strategy was halted by farmers who opposed the loss of their livestock.  
Uruguay changed the strategy to ring vaccination, and eventually vaccination of all cattle in the 
country (Sutmoller & Olascoaga, 2002).  Despite having numbers of infected premises similar to 
the United Kingdom outbreak, Uruguay was able to halt the outbreak in 4 months with 
significantly lower animal and economic losses, however eradication took more than a year 
(Field Experiences with Emergency FMD Vaccination, 2015).  The outbreak ultimately cost 
Uruguay 244 million U.S. dollars and a total of 6,900 animals were destroyed (Field Experiences 
with Emergency FMD Vaccination, 2015).  The opposing response strategies and subsequent 
economic costs depicted in Table 1.1 highlights the need to explore FMD vaccination as an 
outbreak control technique. In fact, an official investigation by the United Kingdom government 
determined that vaccination should be incorporated into future control strategies (Grubman & 
Baxt, 2004).  
 
Table 1.1 Comparing the Impacts of 2001 FMD Outbreaks 
 United Kingdom Uruguay 
Method of response Stamping-out Vaccination & targeted 
stamping-out 
Number of confirmed loci 2,030 2,057 
Duration of outbreak 7 months 4 months 
Cost of outbreak $12.3-$13.8 billion $244 million 






Vaccination as a control strategy has only recently become a goal in the United States.  
Working with the FMD virus for both research and vaccine development has been complicated 
by a 1948 law banning the existence of live FMD virus in the continental U.S. (Segarra & 
Rawson, 2001). In 1982, the North American Vaccine Bank (NAVB) was established in an 
agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. (Segarra & Rawson, 2001). The NAVB 
made vaccines available to each country should they experience an FMD outbreak. The 
supplies from this bank are unlikely to adequately cover the need should an outbreak arise.  
With passage of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, the National Animal Vaccine and 
Veterinary Countermeasures Bank (NAVVCB) was established (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
2020). This is a vaccine bank exclusive to the U.S. that makes a larger number of doses 
available.  The first purchase of vaccine in the bank started in July 2020 with goal of storing 10-
25 million doses of each of the 10-12 highest risk strains (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2020).  
Past outbreaks have demonstrated that vaccination is a viable strategy for FMD control and the 
establishment of the NAVVCB makes this strategy more realistic for the U.S.   
The goals of the U.S. FMD response plan look much different in 2020 than they did 20 
years ago.  Stamping-out is no longer the preferred option for control, depending on the extent 
of the outbreak. As the lead agency for TAD outbreaks and response, USDA Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) establishes the goals, priorities, and plan recommendations 
for specific diseases.  The goals of USDA-APHIS’s FMD response plan is to detect, control, and 
contain the outbreak as quickly as possible using strategies that do not disrupt animal 
agriculture, the food supply, the economy, all while protecting public health (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2020).  Vaccination now plays a larger role in this plan, made possible by the 
establishment of the NAVVCB.  Vaccination alleviates some of the issues that come from 
depopulation strategies such as carcass disposal, loss to producers, loss of genetic stock, and 
interruption of food supplies (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2020). The USDA provides goals 
and recommendations but the states are sovereign and would make the final decision on what 
and how those recommendations are implemented. State animal health officials are updating 
FMD response plans to reflect the strategies recommended by the USDA. Updating KDA’s 
emergency vaccination plan in preparation for a national tabletop exercise was a significant 








Chapter 2 - Learning Objectives and Project Description 
My experience with KDA-DAH began in January 2021 and ended in April 2021.  My daily 
activities and responsibilities for this Field Experience mirrored some of the expected duties of a 
veterinarian employed by KDA-DAH.  This involved meeting with stakeholders, preparation for 
tabletop exercises, and establishing the standards and policies for programs. In early meetings 
with Dr. McReynolds, we discussed my past experiences, current interests, and KDA projects 
currently open.  From that discussion, two different, yet related, projects were identified to which 
I could make a contribution.  Specifically, I would provide valuable input to their emergency 
planning by developing standards for a Certified Swine Sample Collector program and I would 
lay the foundational work for Kansas to expand on its FMD emergency vaccination plan.  With 
those projects in mind, we identified learning objectives and ideal products for each project.  
The learning objectives for my experience included: 
 Understand the scope of work for a State Veterinarian 
 Understand the details required to develop standard operating procedures for 
implementation in an emergency setting 
 Identify knowledge gaps in public understand of response plans 
 Understand the challenges of operating in a multi-agency and inter-professional 
environment 
 Understand how to evaluate gaps in emergency response plans and develop guidance 
to close those gaps prior to an emergent event 
 Understand the challenges of nesting local and state objectives within a national 
framework 
 Construct state plans that nest within a national initiative.  
 
Working with KDA provided me with insights on how states build and nest their programs 
within the federal framework provided by USDA and the state legislature, in order to meet the 
needs of Kansas farmers. This work can be very detailed, laborious, and requires constant 
collaboration within the KDA divisions and with outside organizations.  A key feature of my 
experience were the frequent meetings needed for coordination.  I attended the weekly office 
updates, in which each member provided updates on their various projects planning and 
feedback purposes.  I attended a joint KDA-USDA meeting in which representatives from both 





to review the products and details of my project.  This was a key component of my experience, 
as I learned how to effectively set a meeting agenda and lead discussions in which changes 
were suggested and decisions made.  Dr. McReynolds provided me with the support and 
freedom to address the office as a key member of the team, despite not being an active 
employee.   
 2.1 Certified Swine Sample Collector Program Standard Operating 
Procedures 
The first project I focused on was to develop the standard operating procedures (SOP) 
by which Kansas would implement a Certified Swine Sample Collectors Program.  The 
foundations of this project came from a multi-state agreement and leadership from the NPB to 
train swine facility workers to assist during a commercial swine outbreak.  Successful 
development and implementation of the program would ultimately free veterinary assets to 
respond to active infections while also meeting increased sample collection requirements.  In 
addition, certified collectors would enable facilities within outbreak control areas to submit the 
samples needed for surveillance and ultimately obtain movement permits necessary to continue 
operations. While the curriculum and training materials were being developed by the NPB, KDA 
needed to determine how to implement the training program in Kansas, monitor compliance, 
and effectively utilize these individuals during an outbreak.   
A critical piece of this project was coordinating with the laboratory that provides 
diagnostic support in the event of an outbreak.  The Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic 
Laboratory (KSVDL) is part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), a 
nationwide network of labs that are interconnected and use standardized protocols and 
procedures (National Animal Health Laboratory Network Strategic Plan, 2018).  NAHLN 
laboratories provide the diagnostic support for food, animals, plant health, and water (National 
Animal Health Laboratory Network Strategic Plan, 2018).  I had the opportunity to participate in, 
and lead, meetings with KSVDL representative, Dr. Kelli Almes, to determine how KDA and 
KSVDL would work together for the training program and during an outbreak.  These meetings 
highlighted the importance of discussing communication and logistical challenges of the 
program prior to an emergency. I was also faced with the challenge of incorporating the hands-
on training of preparing and shipping samples for laboratory diagnostics in a manner that did not 





Using the results of meetings with KSVDL and the program framework from the NPB, I 
developed a detailed SOP that would guide KDA personnel, KSVDL, veterinarians, and swine 
workers on expectations and implementation activities of the program. The intent of the SOP 
was to establish the minimum standard to be considered a certified swine sampler, how training 
should be conducted, assessed and documented, and how certified swine samplers would be 
used in an outbreak.  The original plan was to introduce the SOP to swine veterinarians who 
would lead the training for their facilities prior to the completion of my field experience.  
However, time constraints prevented completion of the initial review. To date, I have led an 
internal KDA meeting in which the SOP and some of the ancillary materials were evaluated and 
edited.   
 2.2 FMD Emergency Vaccination Plan 
The second project I supported was the development of Kansas’ FMD emergency 
vaccination plan.  In order to better understand components of a strong vaccination plan, I 
researched USDA guidance on FMD plans and reviewed other existing state plans.  Iowa and 
California have had the benefit of completing tabletop exercises on this topic and kindly 
provided their lessons learned.  In addition, Dr. McReynolds and I met with Ms. Lisa Quiroz, the 
Program Manager of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Section with the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA).  She provided great resources and some 
strategies they were exploring to navigate the challenges presented by the logistical operations.  
I quickly appreciated that a vaccination plan is a massive project that would not be completed in 
my short field experience. Therefore, my goal was to create a foundation that included the 
components of KDA’s earlier plan, input from California and Iowa’s plans, and my input on gaps 
or unanswered questions present.   
Momentum for states to develop and test their FMD vaccination plans has picked up in 
the last two years as the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 established the NAVVCB as well 
as the National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program (NADPRP) to “boost the 
nation’s efforts to keep high-consequence animal diseases from entering and spreading in the 
U.S.” (USDA APHIS, 2021). This made funds available to state departments of agriculture to 
conduct training and participate in exercises.  Kansas participated in a national table-top FMD 
vaccine exercise in May 2021, and I participated in the pre-webinar and workshop discussions 
in preparation for the event.  The goal was to restructure KDA’s FMD vaccination plan to apply 





Exercise Program (VS NTEP) workgroups that focused on developing the FMD Vaccine Field 
Deployment Tabletop Exercise used to test states’ vaccination plans.  These virtual workshops 
improved my understanding of the extensive collaboration and coordination needed to create 
and test emergency response.  
In early meetings with Dr. McReynolds on the topic, we discussed the current lessons 
that could be learned from the COVID-19 vaccination operations in the United States.  Some of 
the challenges we identified were the logistics of transporting, handling, and storage of vaccine 
as well as public perception.  We ultimately sought to answer the question of what stakeholders, 
specifically veterinarians, producers, and members of industry, understood about the FMD 
response plan, the decision to vaccinate, their role in implementation of the plan, as well as their 
feedback on the plan.  I was tasked with developing two surveys, one for veterinarians and one 
for producers to gather this feedback.  The results of the surveys would be analyzed and used 
to develop information campaigns to improve awareness of the plan and involvement in strategy 
development.  In addition to the surveys, the decision was made to host meetings with industry 








Chapter 3 - Results 
 3.1 Certified Swine Sample Collector Program SOP  
After meeting with KSVDL and reviewing program materials from the NPB, I developed a 
comprehensive SOP detailing how the Certified Swine Sample Collector program would function 
in Kansas (Appendix 1).  The most efficient way to establish the program standards was to 
determine how certified samplers would be utilized in the event of a commercial swine TAD 
outbreak.  This included how facilities would be notified to utilize certified collectors, what 
samples to collect, and what diseases to test for.  It also detailed how KDA and KSVDL would 
communicate to verify that submitted samples were collected by USDA category II accredited 
veterinarian or a currently certified collector before samples were tested.  The second part of the 
SOP detailed how swine workers would be trained, the logistics involved, and the minimum 
requirements for certification.  Development of the SOP instigated the drafting of additional 
documents to assist the program. 
The first document drafted to support the SOP included a laboratory submission 
assessment (Appendix 2).  One of the challenges of this training program was obtaining 
feedback for trainees on their performance in preparing and submitting lab samples in a manner 
that did not create additional work for the swine facility or KSVDL.  Packages with broken 
containers, leaked contents, and/or poorly fixed tissues slows down diagnostic testing and 
impairs the emergency response efforts.  From discussions with Dr. Almes of KSVDL, we knew 
that routine shipments often contained poorly packaged and, sometimes, damaged samples.  
Training materials used for instruction were developed by the NPB but did not address methods 
for skill assessment.  We developed a plan that allowed trainees to submit samples and receive 
feedback on the quality while not adding extra samples to those needed for routine surveillance.  
I created a laboratory submission assessment that trainees could send in a package with 
routine surveillance samples.  The laboratory accessioning staff would complete the form and 
return the completed document to the facility veterinarian as feedback on the shipment quality.  
In addition, submission of this form with samples was made optional, at the discretion of the 
veterinarian conducting training.  A minimum standard of reviewing the proper technique for 
preparing and packing samples was described.   
With the implementation of any kind of certification program, it is incumbent on the 
managing organization to monitor compliance with the standards.  As part of the SOP, I needed 





names were reported to KDA.  In addition, I had to establish a timeline and standards for 
recertification.  I created a form documenting the training including the names of the individuals 
who successfully completed the requirements and signature from the training veterinarian 
verifying their confidence in the certified collectors’ skills (Appendix 3).  This form would be the 
record maintained by the veterinarian and submitted to KDA for tracking.  Names and dates are 
to be tracked by KDA and facilities would be prompted to renew certification of their staff during 
the review of their secure food supply plans.  Collectors are required to be recertified annually.  
The list of currently certified collectors could then be provided to KSVDL in the event of a 
commercial swine outbreak to verify against submitted samples prior to testing.  The form and 
framework enable KDA to monitor certified collectors and ensure that samples submitted in an 
outbreak come from trained individuals, and are of sufficient quality to ensure more accurate 
testing.   
Finally, I developed a laboratory submission form to be utilized by certified samplers 
during an outbreak to ship samples (Appendix 4). This form would be managed and maintained 
by KDA and given to specific facilities only in the event of a commercial swine outbreak.  
Receiving this form, along with additional guidance, would serve as notification to authorized 
sites to utilize their certified collectors for sample collection and to ultimately obtain a movement 
permit and return to operation.  Use of this form would allow KDA to control the use of certified 
collectors, answer pertinent questions regarding the facility’s need for testing, and help the lab 
rapidly identify and prioritize sample submission related to the outbreak.   
 3.2 FMD Emergency Vaccination Plan 
The FMD vaccination plan is a massive project requiring constant collaboration and 
coordination with different stakeholders.  I began to appreciate the extent of the undertaking 
while attending the NADPRP and VS NTEP workshops.  Attendees in these workshops included 
numerous state and federal veterinarians working on various aspects of their response plans.  I 
gathered information in meetings from the lessons learned by those states further along in the 
planning process, such as California and Iowa.  Iowa was one of the first states to utilize their 
plan in a tabletop exercise and shared their experiences with other states.  Engaging with 
stakeholders early in the process was critical to gaining cooperation with response efforts. Prior 
to their exercise, representatives from Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship 
(IDALS) met separately with USDA category II accredited veterinarians, producers, and 





the interest and participation of those groups early in the planning process.  California also 
shared their insights gained from developing a vaccination plan.  In meetings with Ms. Lisa 
Quiroz, Program Manager of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Section for Animal 
Health Branch at CDFA she explained that a key gap in their readiness was the logistics of 
receiving, handling, and shipping vaccine throughout the state and warehouse operations. To 
overcome these hurdles, CDFA is exploring contracts with a third-party logistics vendor.   
In the event of an FMD outbreak, states would submit vaccine requests to USDA-APHIS 
detailing their vaccination strategy, numbers of vaccines required, and a warehouse for receipt 
of shipment. Bulk shipments of vaccine would be sent by the manufacturer to the warehouse 
specified, but it is incumbent on the state get the vaccines to the necessary premises and into 
the animals.  This requires extensive cold storage capacity, inventory management, breakdown 
of the shipment into smaller lots, cold chain maintenance, and chain of custody documentation. 
Knowledge of warehouse operations and substantial manpower are needed to facilitate the 
effort. As a result, KDA explored working with a third-party logistics vendor.  The Supply 
companies have extensive experience in managing large inventory, maintaining cold storage, 
and shipping to individual customers.  I had the opportunity to participate in early discussions 
between KDA and a third-party logistics vendor as the requirements and scope of work were 
developed.  Regional and local businesses can play a critical role in emergency response plans 
and appropriate partnerships can free state agency assets to focus resources on other aspects 
of the response.  
With feedback from Iowa, California, and the virtual workshops, I began restructuring 
KDA’s vaccination plan and identifying gaps.  Prior to my Field Experience, KDA-DAH had 
developed an initial vaccination plan.  The document provided a broad overview for how Kansas 
would coordinate their vaccination operations.  It was completed in 2019 and lacked the detail 
needed for how the vaccine would be received and distributed throughout Kansas.  Since that 
time, clearer guidance on program expectations have been passed down from USDA-APHIS 
and lessons learned from other states necessitate updating of the document.  The first step was 
to clearly understand each step in the response process.  For that I developed a process map 
depicting the work flow of each phase of the vaccination plan (Appendix 5).  While not an 
entirely linear operation, the process map served to define each step in the plan.  Next, each 
step in the process map would need to be thoroughly described.   
To restructure the plan, I created an outline based on the process map previously 





1. What initiates this step of the plan? 
2. What factors have to be considered for decision making in this step? 
3. What actions take place in this step? 
4. How are these activities accomplished? 
5. When does this step end? 
Using the original plan developed by KDA in 2019, I sought to answer those questions with the 
decisions already made.  If the original plan did not contain clear guidance, then I included input 
from Iowa’s plan, shared by IDALS.  Due to their previous experience in the tabletop vaccine 
exercise, Iowa’s plan offered a lot of great options to consider in the development of Kansas’ 
plan.  Finally, I reviewed the entire document and identified gaps in the existing plan.  The 
critical gaps are detailed below:  
1. Vaccine prioritization and goals 
2. Organization charts 
3. Establishment and utilization of a vaccination advisory board 
4. Vaccine logistics 
5. Feedback and participation from stakeholders 
Vaccine Prioritization 
It will be logistically impossible to vaccinate 100% of susceptible animals in the event of 
an outbreak.  Further, it may not make scientific sense to vaccinate every animal as different 
species contribute to the transmission of the virus in different ways.  USDA developed a 
guidance document to assist states with the decision of which species, ages, and production 
systems on which to focus valuable resources (USDA-APHIS, 2020). It is not reasonable to set 
hard limits on how vaccines will be used in Kansas prior to an outbreak, as the situation can be 
extremely fluid.  However, communication of the factors determining the vaccination 
prioritization structure to all necessary stakeholders could manage expectations and alleviate 
conflict.  It would also speed delivery to critical elements of the disease chain. The primary 
factors to be used for vaccination prioritization were established in a KDA-DAH working group, 
based on USDA recommendations.  These factors need to be shared with field veterinarians, 
producers, and industry.  
Organization Charts 
The FMD vaccination response will be a multi-agency effort, requiring departments of 
agriculture, transportation, health, environment, and law enforcement to name a few.  A 





required.  For example, early versions of the vaccination plan described vaccination strike 
teams responding to individual premises and supervising vaccination operations.  However, the 
document does not describe how these teams will be manned, the numbers of personnel 
required, and the responsibilities for each position.  Further, the plan describes both a planning 
team and a policy group assisting the emergency operations team with determining the 
vaccination strategy based on the category of outbreak.  The plan does not adequately describe 
who makes up each of these groups and whether they are, in fact, the same thing.  
Developments and updates to these organization charts will require input from multiple state 
offices and is beyond the scope of this project.  However, these issues were communicated to 
KDA as a source of confusion within the plan.  
Establishment and utilization of a vaccination advisory committee 
Decisions of vaccine prioritization and use should be based on scientific evidence and 
minimize impact to Kansas’ animal agriculture economy as much as possible.  Regular review 
of the latest studies and recommendations regarding FMD control is required.  Both Iowa and 
California describe a vaccine advisory committee to ensure the vaccination strategy is based on 
scientific evidence and to regularly review emerging literature on the topic.  However, the 
existing Kansas plan does not describe a group dedicated to this task.  Ideally, this committee 
would consist of representatives from each of the major animal industries, KDA-DAH 
representatives, epidemiologists, disease modelers, agriculture economists, veterinary 
diagnostic laboratory representatives, and FMD subject matter experts. The responsibilities of 
the committee would include regular meetings to review the science behind FMD vaccination 
and forming a consensus on prioritization and guiding vaccine use during an outbreak.  While 
KDA is considering the costs and benefits of utilizing this group, the committee has not yet been 
established and is beyond the scope of this project. 
Vaccine logistics 
The most complicated and yet vital part of the vaccination plan is the method by which 
vaccine will be transported to each animal and administered.  This step requires extensive 
planning and coordination, contingency plans, and adherence to strict requirements such as 
maintenance of cold chain and chain of custody.  Plans for delivery of vaccines and equipment 
to each site hinges on available warehouses within the state with the necessary capacity for 
storage.  Development of a detailed logistics plan is beyond the scope of this project.  However, 
KDA has initiated conversations with a 3rd party logistics vendor, though the scope of work and 





emergency resources is also necessary in the event partnership with a 3rd party fails. Finally, the 
plan needs to detail who will administer vaccines and how that will be accomplished on each 
site.  KDA plans to utilize USDA accreditation category II veterinarians to oversee the vaccine 
administration but will leverage staff on each premises to the greatest extent possible.  This 
places a large responsibility on the veterinarians to engage with producers on the development 
of herd vaccine plans and determine what, if any, assistance will be required.  The veterinarians 
will also be responsible for the documentation and tagging of each vaccinated animal.  This plan 
must be detailed and socialized with Kansas veterinarians.  
Feedback and participation from stakeholders 
Successful implementation of this vaccination plan requires input and participation from 
all stakeholders involved.  Engaging the different groups early in the planning process ensures 
questions and concerns are addressed.  A plan that rapidly controls the outbreak while 
minimizing hardship and economic loss to as many groups as possible would be a goal to strive 
for. The lack of stakeholder engagement was reviewed at length in a KDA-DAH working group 
with plans to set meetings with representatives from each of the animal agriculture industries in 
Kansas.  Surveys were also utilized to gain feedback from stakeholders on the plan.  
During the planning phase of my Field Experience with KDA-DAH, I explored producer 
feedback and understanding regarding potential emergency vaccination for FMD.  Utilizing 
vaccines to control an outbreak can help minimize economic losses and prevent mass 
euthanasia of livestock, but has also has ramifications on trade and the value of the animal.  
Based on the mixed reception by the public for COVID-19 vaccination, efforts in education and 
communication preceding an outbreak may be necessary to improve stakeholder support and 
compliance with the plan.  The Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.) authorizes 
the Secretary of Agriculture to “carry out operations and measures to detect, control, or 
eradicate any disease or pest of livestock” (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2020). Under the 
code, FMD vaccination could be carried out, even without agreement from the owner, assuming 
it is necessary to control the outbreak.  This approach of forced vaccination in the face of owner 
refusal would seem to be highly unlikely and could result in abandonment of the vaccination 
effort. However, addressing the questions and concerns of owners in advance garners support 
for the plan and minimizes conflict.  Surveys of producers and veterinarians to determine their 
current understanding of the FMD response plan were proposed to KDA? 
Separate brief surveys were developed and customized to producers and veterinarians 





in Kansas knew about FMD response plans and the potential for vaccination. This survey data 
was not intended to be used for publication but for internal KDA planning.  Therefore, it did not 
meet the federal definition of research and did not require KSU Institutional Review Board 
review and approval.  The survey was developed in Form site©, a web-based platform that 
allows the user to create forms and surveys.  The link to the veterinary survey was distributed to 
a group email containing USDA category II accredited Kansas veterinarian.  Distribution of the 
producer survey was more problematic and less direct.  The producer survey link was posted in 
KDA-DAH’s routine newsletter, as well as on social media platforms.  At the conclusion of my 
Field Experience, 23 veterinarians had completed the survey but there was only 1 response 
from producers.  The producer survey will be distributed to participants invited to the upcoming 
stakeholder meetings to be completed in advance in hope of improving the response rate but 
will not be discussed further in this report.  
The veterinary FMD response plan survey was shared through an email group containing 
approximately 833 Kansas veterinarians on March 18th.  There were 21 responses within the 
first 5 days and 2 more followed toward the end of the month, with a current response rate of 
2%.  The results of the survey are potentially impacted by response bias in which there are 
possible differences between veterinarians that responded and those that didn’t. These 
differences may influence the lack of response (Dohoo, Martin, & Stryhn, 2014). Non-response 
can occur for a variety of reasons including refusal to participate, the method by which the 
survey was administered, participants forgot about it, or only those most interested in the topic 
of the survey choose to respond.  As a result, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from this 
survey. Figure 3.1 shows USDA accreditation categories of the respondents. With the majority 
(21/23 veterinarians) being level II. The primary species seen in their practices were distributed 
as shown in Figure 3.2.  Both interesting and concerning, the numbers of individuals who were 
unfamiliar with the Kansas FMD Response Plan was just under 50% (10/23) of the respondents. 
Additional questions about the specifics of the plan fared slightly better with around 7 individuals 
being unaware of potential stop-movement orders or the use of vaccine.  It is possible the 
respondents were generally aware of USDA FMD response plan recommendations but were not 
aware of how Kansas, specifically, will implement it.  Support from category II accredited 
veterinarians is extremely important but not all of them will be comfortable providing assistance 
during an outbreak (figure 3.3). Only 18 of the 23 respondents were comfortable assisting with 
vaccination operations.  Reasons given for not being comfortable with assisting in the response 





to a clinical focus in companion animals.  Overall, the trends in the survey responses show a 
need and opportunity to do more outreach with private veterinary community regarding the FMD 
response plan to improve understanding and garner support.    
 
Figure 3.1 Breakdown of respondents’ USDA-APHIS accreditation categories 
 
 







Figure 3.3 Respondents’ comfortable assisting with vaccination, tagging, 







Chapter 4 - Discussion 
Creation of policy and procedure may appear a tedious task but it is an essential one to  
clearly define standards and authorities, unify efforts, and establish and improve 
communication.  Prior to this field experience, I had been only slightly acquainted with the 
coordination and work necessary to develop these technical documents.  Working with KDA-
DAH gave me the opportunity to explore how the science and epidemiology of infectious 
diseases is used to inform standards and programs to control them.  I also better understood 
the complexity of this highly coordinated effort, requiring input from the federal government, 
multiple state agencies, private industry, animal owners, and veterinarians.  I had the 
opportunity to explore how states coordinate with federal authorities and shape unique plans 
within the limits of the federal programs.  With each of my projects, I provided KDA-DAH with a 
solid foundational document that can be applied and tested during disaster preparedness 
exercises.  
 4.1 Certified Swine Sample Collector Program SOP 
The Certified Swine Sampler Program presented some unique challenges to overcome.  
The first was implementing this program in a way that did not impair commercial swine 
operations or the diagnostic laboratory supporting them.  This challenge was addressed by 
making the program both voluntary and beneficial to swine producers.  While not required to 
conduct training, having certified samplers on site in the event of an infectious disease outbreak 
enables the facility to obtain movement permits more rapidly.  Another challenge was 
establishing how KDA-DAH would monitor the program for effectiveness and compliance.  
Setting program requirements, yet not applying oversight is a wasted effort. This was addressed 
by recommending review of each facility’s certified sampler list at the same time that the secure 
food supply plan is reviewed annually.  This enables KDA representatives to submit reminders 
to the facility of when recertification is due.  Finally, I had the challenge of working inter- 
professionally with KSVDL to nest a state program seamlessly into laboratory operations.  This 
was a much easier task to undertake due to the assistance and expertise of Dr. Almes.  Multiple 
meetings and written communication were exchanged to review program intent, challenges, and 






At the conclusion of this Field Experience, I provided KDA-DAH with a detailed SOP for 
program implementation and use in the event of an outbreak.  I also contributed supplemental 
materials for the program such as a certification documentation form for record-keeping, a 
laboratory shipment assessment to facilitate training and feedback, and a laboratory submission 
form.  The next steps for this program would be to present the details to swine veterinarians and 
industry for their feedback.  Ideally, information on the feasibility of implementation and 
perceived value of participating will be important.  Their initial feedback can be used to adjust 
the program before full implementation.  However, it will also be important to re-evaluate the 
performance of the program at a later date to determine its effectiveness and develop possible 
process improvements.  
 4.2 FMD Emergency Vaccination Plan  
Developing the FMD vaccination plan was a massive undertaking and impossible to 
complete in a short Field Experience.  The final plan will be a complex set of coordinating 
operations and will require input from numerous experts to outline each step.  A key step in the 
FMD vaccination plan development will be holding stakeholder meetings.  This will be an 
opportunity to address knowledge gaps and concerns of the different animal agriculture 
industries and field veterinarians.  The surveys developed as part of my Field Experience were 
one of the first steps towards opening those conversations and gathering the necessary 
information.  Face-to-face meetings might have better served to get immediate information but 
the web-based surveys did improve geographic outreach and were the best option in a time of 
recommended social distancing.  
Developing a response plan is a difficult process as the teams try to predict likely 
scenarios of disease spread and likely points of plan failure. Using scenario planning techniques 
to evaluate other state plans and exercises can help identify key outcome drivers.  I was able to 
look at the lessons learned by Iowa in their first state exercise, such as engaging stakeholders 
early, and some recommendations made by CDFA.  There is also a wealth of lessons to be 
learned from the current COVID-19 pandemic.  While the specifics of the vaccination plan differ 
between livestock and humans, the veterinary community has an opportunity to assess how 
human health agencies handled challenges presented by maintaining cold chain, chain of 
custody, vaccine storage, and vaccine prioritization.  With this wealth of information, it is easy to 





extent that no decision is made.  This experience showed me the importance of making the best 
decision possible in the planning process and then testing it in state and national exercises.  
While I was unable to address every unanswered question in the plan, I provided KDA-
DAH with a strong foundation to utilize and test in the May 2021 tabletop vaccine exercise.  I 
outlined the plan in a brief process map to improve understanding.  The shell document is then 
broken down into each step of the plan, providing KDA-DAH the opportunity to answer what will 
be accomplished, how it will be done, and who is responsible for oversight.  I highlighted critical 
planning gaps that needed to be prioritized before the upcoming National exercise.  I also 
provided recommendations based on feedback from two different states working through the 
same process.  The document contains links or copies of necessary resources to accomplish 
the plan, such as the NVS vaccine request form, herd management plans, etc.  KDA-DAH 
should be able to use this document to guide further planning, ultimately creating a one-stop 
document that guides the entire process.   
Setting standards for different outbreak prevention and response programs lays the 
foundation to protect food security, economic security, and, ultimately, public health.  Diseases 
like FMD or CSF can have public health impacts even without directly infecting humans. Animal 
protein and products are key factors in a balanced and healthy diet, especially in young 
children.  Meat, milk, and eggs have highly bioavailable nutrients such as protein, iron, vitamin 
A, and fatty acids and can alleviate nutritional challenges, regardless of socioeconomic status 
(Leroy & Barnard, 2020). Animals also provide a source of income and economic security to a 
family, especially in developing countries.  Infectious diseases that impact animal production, 
through illness and fatalities, can undermine the economic and food security of countries 
(Torres-Velez, Havas, Spiegel, & Brown, 2019).  This Field Experience highlighted the 
importance of the regulatory role of state agriculture departments and the implementation of the 
policies they develop to protect food and economic security. 
 






Chapter 5 - Competencies  
 Student Attainment of MPH Foundational Competencies  
Competency 2: Select quantitative and qualitative data collection methods appropriate for a 
given health context. 
 Qualitative data collection methods were utilized to develop the veterinarian and 
producer FMD response plan surveys.  The surveys were developed to gain an understanding 
of what was known about the potential to vaccinate for FMD and willingness to participate.  
While quantitative data can be transformed into useable statistics, surveys that collect 
qualitative data can be used to understand underlying opinions and motivations. Qualitative data 
can also be analyzed to uncover trends in thought.  These surveys were designed to be short 
and easily understood.  While focus groups could also have been used to gather some of the 
same information, distributing web-based surveys improved the timeliness for response and 
permitted a greater geographic reach. Current social distancing recommendations from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention secondary to the on-going COVID-19 Pandemic 
also prevented gatherings of large groups. 
  
Competency 4: Interpret results of data analysis for public health research, policy, or practice. 
 Data analysis of the veterinarian FMD response plan survey was completed to identify 
trends.  The qualitative results were collected and developed into bar charts for quick 
understanding.  Potentially related questions were evaluated through cross tabulation such as 
whether a respondent was USDA category II accredited and whether their answers reflecting 
awareness of the FMD response plan.  Despite the poor response rate for the short surveys on 
the FMD response plan, there was a general trend identified reflecting a lack of awareness of 
the plans and an opportunity for outreach.  These results can guide talking-points for future 
meetings with private veterinarians.  
 
Competency 13: Propose strategies to identify stakeholders and build coalitions and 
partnerships for influencing public health outcomes. 
 Stakeholder involvement in development of any program or policy can be key in 
garnering support and compliance.  The FMD response plan requires prioritization of finite 





addressed in the planning stages.  In the development of the FMD Emergency Vaccination plan 
for KDA, I recommended the involvement of key stakeholders, including industry 
representatives, producers, and veterinarians.  I encouraged the use of small working groups, 
focusing on individual industries initially, before combining all of the groups.  The goals of these 
groups would be to communicate the intent of the FMD response plan, answer questions, and 
collect concerns or challenges that each industry would face in the event of an outbreak.  The 
survey submitted to producers and veterinarians also contributed to this competency.  The 
results could be used to generate talking points for each group.  The first stakeholder meetings 
are now being scheduled and effort is being made to have key individuals participate in the 
NADPRP tabletop exercise scheduled in May 2021.   
 
Competency #19: Communicate audience-appropriate public health content, both in writing and 
through oral presentation. 
This competency was addressed through the development of standard operating procedures in 
both projects.  These documents were technical in nature and designed to guide specific 
programs.  For the Certified Swine Sample Collectors program, the document will be utilized by 
KDA, swine veterinarians, and KSVDL to guide procedures and understanding of individual 
responsibilities.  The document is written for technical experts and details how training will be 
conducted and reported.  The FMD vaccination plan document is also highly technical.  It will be 
utilized by KDA, representatives of other state agencies, category II accredited veterinarians, 
and industry representatives.  The plan is laid out in a process map to simplify overall 
understanding of each step.  Ideally, the final document will contain detailed instructions for 
each step to be utilized by responding parties.  
 
Competency #21: Perform effectively on interprofessional teams. 
 As part of the Certified Swine Samplers Program, I worked with Dr. Almes from KSVDL.  
The success of this program hinges on timely submission of quality lab specimens for 
diagnostics.  It requires a functional understanding of laboratory operations once samples are 
received. These meetings also helped me develop a plan that could support training of swine 
handlers on sample submission without burdening KSVDL.  Finally, this program requires 
coordination between KDA-DAH and KSVDL in the event of an outbreak to share the listing of 







Table 5.1 Summary of MPH Foundational Competencies 
Number and Competency Description 
2 
Select quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods appropriate for a given 
health context. 
Qualitative data collection methods were utilized 
to develop the veterinarian and producer FMD 
response plan surveys. 
4 
Interpret results of data analysis for public 
health research, policy, or practice. 
The results of the veterinarian FMD response 
plan survey reflect a need and opportunity to do 
more outreach with private veterinary community 
regarding the FMD response plan to improve 
understanding and garner support.    
13 
Propose strategies to identify stakeholders 
and build coalitions and partnerships for 
influencing public health outcomes. 
Involvement of key stakeholders was a critical 
gap identified in the development of the FMD 
vaccination plan.  The survey also contributed 
talking points to future stakeholder meetings.   
19 
Communicate audience-appropriate public 
health content, both in writing and through 
oral presentation. 
Development of technical standard operating 
procedures for the Certified Swine Sample 
Collectors Program and the FMD Vaccination 
Plan. 
21 
Perform effectively on interprofessional 
teams. 
Meetings with Dr. Almes of KSVDL in the 




 Student Attainment of MPH Emphasis Area Competencies 
Competency 1: Pathogens/pathogenic mechanisms 
A thorough understanding of the pathogen and its mechanism for causing disease is required 
before developing disease programs.  The recommendations made in the program need to be 
based in science.  I began my Field Experience by researching each disease addressed by the 
projects I contributed to.  I initially developed a thorough understanding of infectious agents and 
their methods for causing disease through my veterinary degree and study of virology, 
bacteriology, and mycology.  This knowledge was reinforced and enhanced by the DMP 770 






Competency 2: Host response to pathogens/immunology 
Thorough knowledge of a host’s immune system is necessary to understand methods used by 
the pathogen to evade detection and cause disease.  My instruction in immunology began with 
the principles of veterinary immunology course taken while completing my Doctor of Veterinary 
Medicine (DVM) degree.  My understanding of this competency was further enhanced during 
the DMP 770 Emerging Diseases course.  While expertise in immunology is not required for the 
development of an emergency vaccination plan, this knowledge is required by the experts who 
developed the vaccine and officials developing the guidance for prioritization and use.   
 
Competency 3: Environmental/ecological influences  
Climate and other environmental factors are major drivers for the spread of many infectious 
diseases. Climates can impact vector lifecycles, increasing current populations or driving 
vectors to new areas, thus enhancing the spread of some infectious diseases.  The interaction 
between humans, domestic animals, and wildlife can enhance the spread of recognized 
pathogens as well as create opportunities for the spread of emerging pathogens.  This 
understanding of environmental and ecological drivers on infectious disease epidemiology did 
not play a significant role in my field experience, but was reviewed extensively throughout my 
veterinary training and current public health coursework.  MPH 802 Environmental Health 
enhanced my understanding of how the climate and human impacts on the environment drive 
disease patterns.  DMP 770 Emerging diseases reviewed how changes in normal ecology, such 
as habitat encroachment, can provide opportunities for pathogens to cross host species.  
 
Competency 4: Disease surveillance 
 A significant portion of each project involved disease surveillance.  The premise for the 
Certified Swine Sample Collector Program was to train a group of swine handlers as standby 
support for a commercial swine disease outbreak.  These individuals would collect surveillance 
samples from facilities outside of the control zones.  I researched sampling techniques that 
would be required for training and discussed surveillance testing with KSVDL to understand 
what they could support.  The foundational knowledge required for this project was acquired 








Competency 5: Disease vectors 
I was first introduced to the concepts of disease vectors while studying for my DVM degree.  As 
many diseases are transmitted through vectors such mosquitos or biting midges, a basic 
understanding of their lifecycle and interactions with other organisms within their environment is 
necessary. This understanding is reinforced when utilizing the principles of One Health as 
environmental conditions can impact vector populations and, ultimately, the spread of diseases.   
This competency was also reviewed during the MPH 802 Environmental Health course.  Vectors 
and plants did not play a significant role in the spread of the diseases studied in my field 
experience or the plans I constructed; however, soft-bodied ticks have been identified as a 
means of disease spread in Africa.  
 
Table 5.2 Summary of MPH Emphasis Area Competencies 
MPH Emphasis Area: Infectious Diseases/Zoonoses  
Number and Competency Description 
1 Pathogens/pathogenic mechanisms 
Evaluate modes of disease causation of infectious 
agents. 
2 Host response to pathogens/immunology Investigate the host response to infection. 
3 Environmental/ecological influences 
Examine the influence of environmental and 
ecological forces on infectious diseases. 
4 Disease surveillance 
Analyze disease risk factors and select 
appropriate surveillance. 
5 Disease vectors  
Investigate the role of vectors, toxic plants, and 
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  Purpose  of  the  Program  
 
During a large-scale foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, federal and state resources may 
become exhausted. When this occurs, pork industry veterinarians, producers, and caretakers 
become critical resources in the sample collection process on their respective production site(s). 
A sample collection training program assures state and federal animal health officials that 
producers and caretakers have been trained through a standardized process by category II 
accredited veterinarians working in the pork industry to correctly collect, handle, and submit 
samples prior to an outbreak. 
 
In a multi-state partnership, Kansas is taking steps to increase surveillance capacity within the 
state through the use of specially trained industry personnel.  This program enables rapid return 
to operations for facilities outside of the control zone during an outbreak, while maintaining 
quality and accuracy of surveillance testing.  
 
  Background  
Currently in the United States, swine-focused veterinarians either collect or oversee the 
collection of swine samples to test for domestic diseases on production sites. Kansas contributes 
2.7% of the Nation’s total swine population, ranking number 10 (Shahbandeh, 2020).  There are 
approximately 1,000 swine farms in Kansas, with only 150 of these facilities producing 99% of 
the state’s pig inventory (Kansas Pork Association, 2021).  As of February 2021, Kansas has 833 
USDA level II accredited veterinarians authorized in the state.  However, the actual number 
available to support a commercial swine outbreak is likely much lower, dependent on whether 
they are comfortable and competent working with swine and whether they would be willing to 
assist in an outbreak.  During an FAD outbreak, not only do sample collection requirements 
increase, but biosecurity regulations and downtime requirements also increase.  This would make 
it difficult for the few FAD diagnosticians (FADD) and swine-focused veterinarians to perform 
all the necessary diagnostic investigations and sample collections for the large number of swine 
farms involved.  It will also be impossible for veterinarians to perform the necessary surveillance 
or regulatory tasks during an FAD response while also maintaining their ongoing herd health and 
animal welfare programs on their farms.  This support gap could be adequately filled with 
designated and trained personnel at each site who are ready to collect and submit samples. 
  Rat iona l  for  Tra in ing Program  
During an FAD outbreak, producers and caretakers could be utilized to help address the limited 
number of FADDs as well as the shortage of swine veterinarians. However, these individuals 
will need training in sample collection techniques, ideally prior to an outbreak. Trained 
individuals could assist with control of the outbreak by collecting samples for the purpose of 
surveillance.  This frees veterinary assets to focus their expertise on investigations of contact 
premises or those with clinically ill animals.   
The absence of such a training and certification program is devastating in that it would greatly 




controlling the outbreak as well as for the implementation of the Secure Pork Supply Plan to 
ensure that affected but uninfected farms meet the conditions of the movement permit. An 
inadequate disease response inflicts great harm on the industry long-term, negatively impacts 
animal welfare, jeopardizes livelihoods, and significantly impacts the U.S. economy.  
The decision to utilize Certified Swine Sample Collectors in the event of an FAD outbreak will 
be determined by the Kansas State Animal Health Official (SAHO).  Additional information to 
be provided in the event of an outbreak will include which samples and how many are to be 
collected. During the outbreak, accredited veterinarians have final oversight and may need to 
sign off on submission of the samples collected as determined by the SAHO. This relationship 
will be critical for the veterinarians and Certified Swine Sample Collector. 
 
  Tra in ing Program Over view  
Category II accredited veterinarians will train producers and caretakers in sample collection and 
shipment prior to an outbreak.  The veterinarians will utilize provided resources for training so 
stakeholders can be assured all Certified Swine Sample Collectors are trained and evaluated 
consistently. Participation in this program is voluntary.  Fees may be charged by the veterinarian 
for the training process.  The premises is responsible for costs incurred from training.  
The training program consists of two components that could be conducted together or in separate 
sessions: 
1. Classroom instruction: Producers and caretakers will review standardized videos and 
handouts provided, under the instruction of their facility veterinarian. The materials are 
available in English or Spanish and address sample collection types and techniques as 
well as clinical signs associated with FAD of interest: African Swine Fever (ASF), 
Classical Swine Fever (CSF), and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). In addition, the 
veterinarian will review the proper preparation and packaging of samples using the 
resources provided to ensure arrival at the laboratory in good condition.  The standards 
for shipping will be based on guidance from the National Animal Health Laboratory 
Network (NAHLN) laboratory, Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory 
(KSVDL).  Sample shipments will be in compliance with Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) regulations. Training can be conducted in a group or individual 
setting. 
 
2. On-farm training: Following completion of the classroom instruction, the veterinarian 
will demonstrate sample collection.  Trainees will practice sample collection and 
demonstrate competency for the veterinarian to approve them as Certified Swine Sample 
Collectors.  The veterinarian will also demonstrate preparation and packaging of samples 
and completion of appropriate laboratory submission forms(s).  
 
3. Optional – NAHLN submissions: In the event of an FAD outbreak in Kansas, the 
designated NAHLN laboratory for sample submission is KSVDL. Producers and 
caretakers who have completed the classroom and on-farm instruction can request 




documentation. Request for feedback is done by including a shipment assessment 
(Appendix 1).  The form follows the samples throughout KSVDL and feedback on 
quality of collection and packaging is documented.  The completed form is then returned 
to the veterinarian who conducted the training via email.    While not all swine facilities 
use KSVDL as their primary diagnostic laboratory of choice for routine surveillance, they 
are encouraged to become familiar with KSVDL requirements and recommendations 
before an FAD outbreak.     
  Curr icu lum 
A variety of training resources are available on sample collection and shipment of samples.  At a 
minimum, to be considered a Certified Swine Sample collector, the trainee will be proficient in: 
1. Recognizing basic clinical signs for ASF, CSF, and FMD 
2. Collection of oral fluids 
3. Collection of whole blood and blood swab 
4. Collection of nasal swab 
5. Collection of laryngeal swabs 
6. Collection of vesicular fluid 
7. Preparation of samples for shipment 
8. Packaging of samples 
9. Completion of submission forms 
10. Collection of tissues post-mortem, including spleen, tonsils, and lymph nodes 
(gastrohepatic and renal for ASF; mesenteric, submandibular, and retropharyngeal for 
CSF) 
  Logist i cs  
Classroom instruction necessitates the use of a computer with both audio and video capabilities 
to play training videos.  Room capacity necessary is based on number of trainees.  The on-farm 
training will require access to animals for the purpose of demonstrating sampling techniques.   
 
  Time Requi rements  
Classroom instruction can be expected to take up to 2 hours to complete, depending on questions 
and discussion.  On-farm training can be expected to take up to 4 hours or more depending on 
the number of trainees present.  Training can be completed in 1 day or can be split into 2 separate 
days, as schedules permit.  
 
  Train ing  Mater ia ls  
 Course work 
Videos and handouts demonstrating collection for each type of sample are available online for 
Certified Swine Sample Collectors to review during and after training. Videos and handouts are 





Supplies necessary to complete this training are listed below.  Facilities are responsible for 
providing their own supplies and will not be reimbursed for cost.  
 
 
Collection of Oral Fluids 
 3/8” or ½” cotton Rope 
(3-stranded twisted, 
undyed, unbleached) 
 Gallon plastic bag 
 Cutting tool 
 Conical sample tube 
Whole Blood Collection 
 Blood tube 
 Syringe (or Vacutainer™ 
Hub) 
 Needles 
o Prewean = 20 x 3/4” 
or 1” 
o Nursery = 16 or 18 x 
1.5” 
o Finisher/adults = 18 





 Necropsy knife (thin, 
flexible blade) 
 Knife sharpener 
 Surgical scissors 
 Forceps 
 Screw-top containers 







 Sterile, long-handled 
spoon 
 Dacron®/polyester swab 
 Sample tube containing 
3 ml of TBTB  
Sample Shipment 
 Whirl-pak® or zippered 
bags 
 Black electrical tape or 
parafilm to seal 
specimen tubes 
 Paper towels or other 
absorbent material 
 Fine point permanent 
marker 
 Ball point pen 
 Submission form 
 Styrofoam cooler 
 Frozen ice packs 
 Cardboard box 
 
   
 
  Evaluat ion  and Repor t ing  
Evaluation will be based on the following criteria: 
1. Collectors must be evaluated by the veterinarian on technical skill. During the on-farm 
training, veterinarians will observe sample collection and evaluate the collector’s 
technique as acceptable or not acceptable.  
2. Optional: On their own within 60 days after the written assessment and the sample 
collection demonstration, Collectors must collect and submit two samples to a pre-
arranged NAHLN lab. The NAHLN lab will evaluate the sample quality and integrity 




A Collector must satisfactorily pass the on-farm demonstration in a manner that the certifying 
veterinarian has confidence the individual will perform well in the future in the absence of 
supervision.  Each individual who passes the sample collection assessment should be 
documented on the KDA Documentation of Training form (Appendix 2) and the completed list 
will be signed by the certifying veterinarian.  Signed forms will be copied and submitted to KDA 
by email Dr. Sara McReynolds at sara.mcreynolds@ks.gov.  Records will be maintained in USA 
Herds.  
 
  Renewal /Recer t i f ica t ion  
Retraining and certification of Certified Swine Sample Collectors must be completed annually, 
from the date of the previous training.  Veterinarians should take the renewal training as an 
opportunity to address performance concerns with past sample submissions as well as any 
updates to the program.  Collectors may “test out” of renewal training by demonstrating 
appropriate expertise with specified sample collection and appropriate packing for shipment.   
At a minimum, collectors renewing their authorization must demonstrate competency in the 
following:  
1. Recognizing basic clinical signs for ASF, CSF, and FMD 
2. Collection of oral fluids 
3. Collection of whole blood and blood swab 
4. Collection of nasal swab 
5. Collection of laryngeal swabs 
6. Collection of vesicular fluid 
7. Preparation of samples for shipment 
8. Packaging of samples 
9. Completion of submission forms 
10. Collection of tissues post-mortem, including spleen, tonsils, and lymph nodes 
(gastrohepatic and renal for ASF; mesenteric, submandibular, and retropharyngeal for 
CSF) 
Collectors who fail to competently perform the above tasks, must complete the classroom and 
on-farm training for the specific failed topics with the veterinarian.  Veterinarians may elect to 
conduct the full training annually for all personnel, if desired.   
 
Collectors recertified by the veterinarian will be documented on the KDA Certified Sampler List 
and a copy submitted to KDA following completion of the training.   
 
Recertification of trained Certified Swine Sample Collectors should also occur whenever there is 
veterinarian turn-over at the premises.  The new attending veterinarian should become familiar 
with the details of the program and be confident in the skills demonstrated by the collectors 
before recertifying.  
  Oversight  
KDA-DAH will review Certified Sampler Lists for expired training when Secure Food Supply 




veterinarian to ensure training is kept up to date.  Failure to do so could result in delayed 
movement permits as the premises would have to wait for an accredited veterinarian to collect 
and submit samples.   
  Program Implementat ion  
In the event of a commercial swine infectious disease outbreak with either Classical Swine Fever 
(CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF), or Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), the decision to utilize 
Certified Swine Sample will be determined by the Kansas State Animal Health Official (SAHO).  
Premises will be notified individually that they are authorized to use Certified Collectors to 
obtain movement permits.  This notification will include an email containing the KDA/KSVDL 
laboratory submission form.  Only facilities receiving the submission form will be permitted to 
utilize certified samplers.  Additional information to be provided in the event of an outbreak will 
include:  
a. The suspected or confirmed FAD agent to test;  
b. which samples to collect; 
c. how many animals to sample; 
d. how many negative tests required before movement permits are authorized; 
e. designated laboratory submission form (to be provided to authorized premises during 
an outbreak) 
During the outbreak, accredited veterinarians have final oversight and may need to sign off on 
submission of the samples collected as determined by the SAHO. Samples submitted that were 
not specified by the SAHO will not be tested by the laboratory. Samples submitted by any 
individual who is not a currently trained Certified Collector or Category II accredited 
veterinarian will not be tested.  Submission forms will be checked against the most current list of 
certified swine collectors documented by KDA for the approved premises at the time of the 
outbreak.  Finally, samples submitted from facilities not specified in the control and surveillance 
zones will not be tested.   
 
Certified Swine Sample Collectors and veterinarians will use KSVDL as the designated NAHLN 
laboratory during an outbreak.  Collectors and veterinarians will use the KDA laboratory 
submission form (Appendix 3) that will be provided in the event of an outbreak.  Certified 
Collectors will be required to document their information on the form for verification against the 
current training list. Use of a premise ID bar code on the form will be required.  Premise ID bar 
codes can be obtained from KSVDL prior to an outbreak and kept on file.  UN3373 labels and 
discount UPS shipping labels can also be obtained by contacting KSVDL.   
 
KSVDL will report laboratory results to KDA, who will then issue the movement permits to the 
premises.   
 
Premises within the designated control area of an outbreak can request reimbursement for 




  Par t ic ipant  Qual i f ica t ions  and Responsib i l i t ies  
  Trainer  
Sample collection trainers must meet the following qualifications: 
1. Be a USDA category II accredited veterinarian. 
2. Have a valid veterinarian/client/patient relationship (VCPR) with the premises and collectors 
they certify. 
3. Willingness to co-sign the diagnostic sample submission forms for the Certified Collectors 
they trained, if required by SAHO. 
4. Approval from KDA to conduct training. 
The responsibilities of a trainer include but are not limited to: 
5. Following program requirements when conducting training  
6. Scheduling and conducting sample collection training sessions with producers and caretakers 
7. Document names and contact information of those approved to collect samples at the 
conclusion of training on the KDA Certified Sampler List.  
8. Submit copy of trainees approved for sample collection to KDA-DAH and maintain records 
for 1 year. 
9. Conduct renewal training with previously certified individuals on an annual basis or in the 
event of veterinarian turn-over.  
  Cert i f i ed  Swine Sample  Col l ec tor  
Certified swine sample collectors must meet the following qualifications:  
- Be an employee of the facility where they are certified to collect samples. 
- Attend a sample collection training session hosted by attending veterinarian for premises. 
- Successfully complete hands-on evaluation demonstrating the correct technique to collect 
samples 
- Be approved by the USDA category II accredited veterinarian for the premises. 
The responsibilities of a certified swine sample collector include but are not limited to: 
- Participation in training and passing the evaluation.  
- Properly collecting, packing, and submitting samples during an FAD outbreak, when 
given permission to do so by the SAHO.  
- Follow the direction of the accredited veterinarian for that premises.   
- Renew certification annually. 
- Optional: submit the sample shipment assessment (appendix 1) with routine surveillance 
samples to obtain feedback from KSVDL on performance.  
  Laborato ry  
The responsibilities of KSVDL in this program include but are not limited to: 
- Providing guidance on how samples should be packaged and shipped appropriately. 
- Providing shipping labels to facilities when requested.  
- Providing premises ID barcodes to facilities when requested. 
- Providing feedback on quality of sample collection, packaging, and shipment via the 




- Verify sample submission from a Certified Collector using the list provided by KDA 
  Kansas Department  o f  Agr icu l tu re  
The responsibilities of KSVDL in this program include but are not limited to: 
- Review and update standard operating procedure document.  
- Communicate updates to standard operating procedure to veterinarians, Certified 
Collectors, and KSVDL. 
- Provide submission form to authorized premises in the event of an outbreak 
- Provide KSVDL with current list of Certified Collectors from authorized premises in the 
event of an outbreak.  
- Provide guidance on completion of the sample submission form. 
 
  Frequent ly Asked Quest ions  
 Are facilities required to participate in this program? 
The intent of this program is to be voluntary for participation.  Participation in this program 
provides facilities with the opportunity to have specially trained staff prepared to collect the 
necessary samples for movement permits.  Facilities that choose not to participate may 
experience a delay in obtaining permits for movement as a category II veterinarian must be 
available to collect and submit the necessary surveillance samples. 
 How long does the certification last? 
Trained samplers must renew their certification annually.  
 Where can I find training materials? 
Training materials have been developed and published by with support from the Secure Pork 
Board and can be found at: 
https://www.securepork.org/training-materials/disease-monitoring-sample/  
 How do I submit names of trained personnel to KDA-DAH records? 
Each individual who passes the sample collection assessment should be documented on the KDA 
Certified Sampler List and the completed list will be signed by the certifying veterinarian.  
Signed forms will be copied and submitted to KDA by email Dr. Sara McReynolds at 
sara.mcreynolds@ks.gov.  Records will be maintained in USA Herds.  
 
 How will I know if my facility is permitted to utilize certified samplers in the 
event of an outbreak? 
Select facilities will be permitted to submit samples using certified samplers based on their 
location in relation to active outbreaks.  Individual facilities will be notified via email by KDA-
DAH that they are authorized to use certified samplers.  Included in that email will be the 
laboratory submission form required in the outbreak, along with additional information: 




b. which samples to collect; 
c. how many animals to sample; 
d. how many negative tests required before movement permits are authorized; 
e. designated laboratory submission form (to be provided to authorized premises during 
an outbreak) 
 What should I do to receive feedback on sample submission if my facility 
does not use KSVDL routinely? 
KSVDL will be the designated laboratory sample submission in the event of a commercial swine 
outbreak in Kansas.  Facilities that do not routinely submit samples to KSVDL are encouraged to 
become familiar with KSVDL’s standards and requirements before an outbreak occurs.  
Facilities can reach out to KSVDL to generate a premise ID barcode. Pre-formatted UPS ground 
shipping labels can be obtained from KSVDL by contacting them correctly. 
  Pr imary Program Contacts  
  Kansas Department  o f  Agr icu l tu re  
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  Cer t i f ied  Swine  Sample  Col lec tors  Program  
Laboratory Submiss ion Assessment  
Name of Facility:  




Veterinarian email:   
Veterinarian phone:   
Packaged by:  
**To be completed by the Laboratory** 
Reviewed by: ________________________________________________________ 
The shipping container was appropriately addressed. Yes No 
- Sender’s name, address, and phone number present. Yes No 
- Recipient’s name address, and phone number present. Yes No 
The shipping container was appropriately labeled with the biological substance. Yes No  
- The statement “biological substance, Category B” was present, or labeled 
“diagnostic specimen 
Yes No  
- A UN3373 diamond label affixed to the box Yes No  
All labels on the shipping container were covered in clear tape Yes No  
Shipping container:    
- Leak-proof Yes No  
- Rigid Yes No  
- Insulated Yes No  
Notes:    
   
   
Sample submission paperwork was placed in a plastic bag Yes No  
Sample submission paperwork was placed between the secondary and tertiary 
containers 
Yes No  
Empty space between the secondary and shipping containers was filled with 
newspaper or bubble wrap 
Yes No  
Ice packs included in the shipment if fresh tissues were sent Yes No  





Notes:   
   
   
 





- Leak-proof Yes No  
- Contained absorbent material Yes No  
- Contained enough absorbent material to capture all liquid contents Yes No  
Notes:   
   
   
Primary containers labeled properly and legibly Yes No  
- Tissue source Yes No  
- Date  Yes No  
- Farm information Yes No  
- Leak-proof Yes No  
- Screw-top lids Yes No  
- Padded to prevent breakage Yes No  
Notes:    
   
Was the primary container broken, chipped, or cracked? Yes No  
Was the primary container leaking? Yes No  
Was there enough formalin to fix all tissues? Yes No  
Samples appropriate for requested tests? Yes No  
 










Cer t i f ied  Swine  Sample  Col lec tor  Program 
Documentat ion  of  Tra in ing  
 
Name of Veterinarian: 
_____________________________________ 
 




















Date of Training: _________________________ 
 
By signing, I am confirming that all personnel listed on this document have been trained to 
standard as specified in the Kansas Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal Health 
Standard Operating Procedure ###### 
X
V e t e r in a r ia n  S ig n a t u re
Name Type of Training 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 
 Initial □                     Refresher □ 








COLLECTION DATE:      
# Barn / Room ID Animal / Sample ID Age/Lot  # Barn / Room ID Animal / Sample ID Age/Lot 
1     11    
2     12    
3     13    
4     14    
5     15    
6     16    
7     17    
8     18    
9     19    
10     20    

























□ Sow/Breeding   □Nursery    □ Finisher 
□ Farrow to Finish    □Wean to Finish 








Site Name (if not on 
label)_____________________ 
Clinical signs?   □Yes    □No 
TEST(S) REQUESTED 
□ African Swine Fever PCR 
 
□ Classical Swine Fever PCR                          □ Foot and Mouth Disease PCR 
INCIDENT AREA/ZONE 
□ Control Area 
□ Surveillance Zone 
□ Free Zone 
 
REASON FOR SUBMISSION 
□ Mortality/Morbidity Event 
□ Surveillance 
□ Post C&D 
□ Post-Restocking 
□ Permitted Movement 
□ Into Control Area 
□ Out of Control Area 
□Within Control Area 
□To/From Surveillance/Free Zone 
SPECIMEN(S) TYPE 
FMD 




□ Whole blood 
□ Blood swab □ Blood card  
□ Fresh tonsil 
□ Fresh spleen 
□ Spleen swab 
□ Lymph node (renal or 
gastrohepatic) 
CSF: 
□ Whole blood 
□ Fresh tonsil 
□ Fresh spleen 
□ Lymph node (mesenteric, 
submandibular, 
retropharyngeal) 
Certified Swine Sample Collector?                  
□ Yes    □No 
 
Name: 
Commercial Swine Disease 
Outbreak Submission Form 
KSVDL at Kansas State University 
1800 Denison Avenue, Mosier D117 
Manhattan, KS 66506 
Phone: (866) 512-5650 
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